NEPTUNE: D-Day Lift of the 101st Airborne Division
Source: WSEG Staff Study No. 3, A Historical Study of Some World War II Airborne Operations, 20 Feb 1951, US Army.
0100-0200 June 6, 1944
Paracute |
Glider Transport |
Personnel | |
| 501 PIR1 | 134 |
2211 | |
| 502 PIR1 | 117 |
1930 | |
| 506 PIR1 | 120 |
1980 | |
| 377 PFAB2,3 | 54 |
547 | |
| Total | 425 |
6668 |
0400 June 6, 1944
| 81 AAAT4 | 52 |
220 | |
| 2 btty plus | misc |
||
| Total | 425
|
52
|
6888 |
2100 June 6, 1944
| Misc5 | (Horsa)32
|
165 | |
| Total | 425
|
82
|
7053 |
Notes:
| 1 | TOE: Includes 8x 81mm mortars and 27x 60mm mortars. |
| 2 | TOE: includes 10x .50 cal machine guns and 17x 75mm pack howitzers. |
| 3 | Only 1 pack howitzer was salvaged from the D-Day drop, and there is every indication that this gun was never fired on D-Day. |
| 4 | TOE: includes 16x 57mm AT guns. |
| 5 | Medical, communications personnel, and material. |
Disregarding a few stray sticks, the drop of the 101st was scattered over a rectangle 25 by 15 miles. About 75% of the initial lift unloaded in an area about 8 miles square. The 1500 paratroopers (22% of the total personnel) who landed outside this area were either killed or captured without contributing directly to the accomplishment of the D-Day mission.
Rappart and Northwood, Rendesvous with Destiny— A History of the 101st Airborne Division, Infantry Journal Press, 1948, pg 95.Very little quantitative data is available on equipment recovery in Neptune, except that 60% of all bundles in the 101st Division Assault were not recovered during the airborne phase of the battle.
Reorganization on the Ground:
World War II training exercises indicated that night reorganizations would require about one hour to reorganize 80% of unit strength under conditions of good jump geometry and use of the visual, radio, and aural aids available at the time and well trained troops. This figure was substantiated in the regimental drops behind our own lines to reinforce our beachhead forces at Salerno.
For daylight reorganization, training results under excellent conditions show that from 30 to 40 minutes is ordinarily required to secure 80% reorganization of a unit of regimental size and from 20 to 30 minutes for battalions.
It appears that the reorganization criteria used, one hour and 80% strength for night drops and 20 minutes and 80% for daylight drops, were about equally difficult to attain and were about 30 to 40% above the best performance actually attained in combat.
Casualties
In 101st Airborne, 2.4% of the total were jump casualties. This can be compared to the 82nd Divison's 4.24%. Here there were 36 known drownings, 13.3 percent of the total, in the Merderet flooded area in this jump.
Gliderborne troops suffered 10.1% casualties, primarily because of the terrain involved. The 82nd lost 10.6%.
These losses can be compared with those in operation Market, a daylight drop over open terrain. 101st Airborne lost 1.36% in the parachute drops, and only 1.36% in the glider landings.
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